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Abstract
The classical logical antinomy known as Richard-Berry paradox is combined with plausi-
ble assumptions about the size i.e. the descriptional complexity, of Turing machines formal-
izing certain sentences, to show that formalization of language leads to contradiction.
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Formal semantics of language has roots in the disciplines of logic, philosophy and math-
ematics with pioneering work by Frege and Russell in the early 20th century and important
addition by Tarski and Carnap in particular. It emerged as an important area of linguistics
in the 1970s from seminal research by Richard Montague. In recent years fruitful applica-
tions of aspects of formal semantics have been made in computational linguistic, artificial
intelligence, and natural language processing.
Various fragments of English and other languages have been carefully formalized, but the
ultimate objective of complete formalization is still remote, and not everybody, to say the
least, believes it to be realistic.
This correspondence exhibits an internal contradiction inherent in language formalization,
in the classical form of a logical paradox.
The Richard-Berry paradox. It is good to start by recalling the logical paradox
described in the Principia Mathematica (Russell and Whitehead, 1917), where the authors
say the paradox “was suggested to us by Mr. G.G. Berry of the Bodleian Library”. The
Richard-Berry Paradox is the definition of a number as
“the least number that cannot be defined in fewer than twenty words.” (1)
The antinomy is explained by (Li and Vita´nyi 1997) as follows:
If this number exists, we have just described it in thirteen words, contradict-
ing its definitional statement. If such number does not exist, then all natural
numbers can be described in fewer than twenty words.
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. . .
Formalizing the notion of “definition” as the shortest program from which a num-
ber can be computed by the reference [Turing] machine U , it turns out that the
quoted statement (reformulated appropriately) is not an effective description.
It is known that the proof of the impossibility of calculating the number described in (1)
gives a way of rephrasing Go¨dels incompleteness theorem.
We observe in statement (1) the word “least” has the usual arithmetic sense, as well
as the meaning that the number referred to is the first encountered in the enumeration
1, 2, 3, . . .. The paradox still holds if we replace the “least number” by the “first number”
(in the enumeration) or, if, instead of natural numbers, we use other discrete enumerable
structures, such as rational numbers. Would the paradox still hold if numbers are replaced
by texts?
Moving from this, the present note argues that the statement that natural language can
be completely formalized leads to antinomy.
The formal semantics paradox. Let us focus on some natural language, say En-
glish, and assume that any text can be precisely formalized by a Turing machine (or for that
matter by any other computationally complete formalism). This means that given a text,
a procedure exists translating it to a formal definition, as the description or program of a
Turing machine. We do not rule out the possibility that a text be formalized in different
ways, corresponding to different Turing machines.
A Turing machine description can be encoded into a binary string, and the strings describing
Turing machines can be enumerated by increasing size. Thus any machine has a position in
the enumeration, and it makes sense to say that a machine comes before or after another.
The notion of machine size can be made rigorous enough, as done in the theory of complexity
of Kolmogorov, Chaitin, and Solomonoff, for which we refer to the classical book (Li and
Vita´nyi 1997). Here we take size as synonymy of the position of a machine in the above
enumeration.
Since a text may have more than one formal definition, we consider the first one in the
enumeration as the reference definition. Thus the reference machine is the one of least size
among the definitions of a text.
The size of the reference machine formalizing a certain text will be called the formal com-
plexity of the text.
Now we can imagine to sort the English texts in ascending order of their formal complex-
ity. This means text one precedes text two, if their respective formal definitions as Turing
machines, which we have assumed to be computable, are in that order in the enumeration.
Since texts are now ordered, it makes sense to consider
“the first text such that its formal complexity is not less than twenty.” (2)
Sentence (2) will be denoted by t(20), to emphasize that it is parameterized by the number
twenty. By changing the numerical parameter, we may obtain similar sentences denoted as
t(21), and so on.
Before we proceed with the main argument, we have to make explicit two intuitively
reasonable assumptions on the complexity of formal descriptions.
Unboundedness assumption. For each integer n, there exists a text having formal com-
plexity greater than n.
The idea is that texts may require arbitrarily complex formal descriptions.
Logarithmic complexity. Consider the family of sentences t(20), t(21), . . .. For any in-
teger n greater than twenty, the formal complexity of t(n) does not exceed the formal
complexity of t(20) by more than a quantity proportional to log(n).
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To justify the assumption, consider that the formal description of t(n) includes two
parts: one is independent of n and therefore has a size less than the size of t(20); the
other part has a logarithmic complexity, since it is well known that integers can be
encoded by a positional number representation having a logarithmic number of digits.
Main argument. Two cases are possible.
1. First suppose “the first text” referred to in (2) exists, and consider the complexity of
the formal description of sentence t(20). Two subcases are possible.
(a) The formal complexity of t(20) is less than twenty. Since t(20) provides a definition
of ‘the first text. . . ”, we have found a formal description of it contradicting the
definition.
(b) The formal complexity of t(20) is k ≥ 20. Then, from the logarithmic complexity
assumption, one can find a sufficiently large integer K greater than k such that the
formal complexity of sentence t(K) is less than K, thus obtaining a contradiction
for the “the first text such that its formal complexity is not less than K.”
2. Second, suppose “the first text” referred to in (2) does not exists. Then any text would
have formal complexity less than twenty, contradicting the unboundedness assumption.
To conclude, we observe the classical Richard-Berry paradox relies on an enumeration of
English sentences ordered by the number of words they contain, i.e. essentially by their
length. This version of the paradox orders the sentences according to the length of their
formalizations (say by Turing machines), assumed to exist. The ensuing contradiction proves
that a complete computational formalization of natural language sentences is impossible.
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